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I. INTRODUCTION
Banking in the United States has changed dramatically in
the past few decades.' No longer constrained by geographic
limitations, Americans have expanded to interstate markets due to
increased mobility and technology.2 In response to these changing
habits, Congress has enacted legislation intended to restructure an
outdated banidng system?
Usury laws, which prohibit loans at excessive interest
rates,4 have traditionally been the province of state governments.s
Under the theory of protecting the citizens, many states impose
1. Mark D. Roringer, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the Ricglc-Neal
Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183. 210 (1996): see also Tim McCarthy, Refining
Product Market Definition in the Antitrust Analysis of Bank Mergers, 41 Dtr-E LJ.
865, 878 (1997) ("JRlevolutionary changes have shaken the banking industry to the
core .... "). One of the most dramatic changes in the banking industry includes the
introduction of online banking. See Thomas W. Beetham, The Community
Reinvestment Act and Internet Banks: Redefining the Community, 39 B.C. L. REV.
911, 920 (1998). Furthermore, changes that have occurred in the banking industr,
such as changes in interstate banking and branching, have made several banking laws
inefficient. Richard M. Whiting, A Perspective on Financial Services Restructuring, 37
CATH. U. L. REv. 347,360 (1988).
2. Rollinger, supra note 1, at 192.
3. Id. at 192-93; Hayley M. Brady & Mark V. Purpura, The Riegle-Neal
Amendments Act of 1997: The Impact of Interstate Branching, on the Dual Ban!:inq
System, 2 N.C. BANING INST. 230, 2-30-31 (1998); see infra notes 18-63 and
accompanying text.
4. BLAci'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999). But see LISSA L. BROOME &
JERRY W. NlzK. HAN. REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 351-52
(2001)
(Even in those states that regulate interest rates on loans, there are
often exemptions from such regulation for corporate borrowers or
for large loans, under the theory that corporate borrowers or those
who borrow large sums of money are likely to be
sophisticated enough to bargain for a reasonable rate of interest.).
5. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts. 971 F.2d 818, 828 (1st Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993).
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strict limitations on interest rates.6 These limits, however, have
proven harmful to both banks and consumers in many states.
States with strict usury limitations have been disadvantaged
because banks have chosen to locate in states with liberal usury
laws.8 Since capital is necessary for growth, an exodus of capital
causes economic stagnation in states that have strict usury laws.9
For example, both Arkansas and North Carolina have experienced
a withdrawal of capital due to strict state usury laws.'0 States such
as Delaware, Georgia, and South Dakota, however, have a
disproportionately greater concentration of banks due to an
absence of usury limits." In an attempt to remedy this and other
6. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 4, at 351; Timothy W. Grooms, What Is
the Real Cost of Small Business and Middle Market Lending? Usury in Arkansas:
Preemption Ushers in New Era, ACB MAGAZINE, at http://www.acbonline.org/
winter2000/feature6.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). Banks that violate usury laws
are assessed a penalty. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 4, at 352 (noting that if a
national bank charges consumers usurious interest, the bank will be assessed a
penalty which is set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 86).
7. Linda Carron, Credit Card Regulations Prompt BB&T Move, TRIANGLE Bus.
J. (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 5, 1997, at 5; see Grooms, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., Carron, supra note 7, at 5; Grooms, supra note 6. Banks will not
lend money for a risky loan at ten percent interest in a state with strict usury laws if
they can lend the money at fifteen percent interest in another state. See FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, CONTROLLING INTEREST: ARE CEILINGS ON INTEREST
RATES A GOOD IDEA?, at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/controlinterest/
controlinterest.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2002) [hereinafter CONTROLLING INTEREST].
Thus, small businesses and individuals have difficulty obtaining financing due to the
risk banks must assume. See Grooms, supra note 6. Furthermore, usury laws are not
the only factor banks consider when choosing a home state. For example, despite
strict state usury laws, North Carolina is home to two of the five largest banks in the
United States-Bank of America and Wachovia. NORTH CAROLINA CITIZENS FOR
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, ABOUT THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, at
http://www.nccbi.org/northl.htm (last visited Feb. 27,2002).
9. See, e.g., Grooms, supra note 6.
10. See id.; Carron, supra note 7, at 5. North Carolina, a prominent banking
state, has experienced a withdrawal of banks that issue credit cards within the state
due to strict state-imposed usury laws that prohibit creditors from charging the higher
interest rates that are allowed in numerous other states. Carron, supra note 7, at 5.
11. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 4, at 351 (explaining that Delaware and
South Dakota are among the states that do not limit interest rates on loans); Carron,
supra note 7, at 5 ("Delaware and Georgia are among the nation's leading credit-card
employment states because of their liberal laws .... "). NationsBank's credit card
business is based in Delaware, Wachovia's is in Georgia, and Bank of America's is in
Delaware. Carron, supra note 7, at 5; State of 5 Cs, ECONOMIC TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000.
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banking problems, Congress has repeatedly preempted state usury
laws.12
This Note discusses federal preemption of state usury laws
and the policy issues surrounding legislated interest rates. First,
this Note provides a brief legislative and judicial history of usury
laws. 3 Next, this Note explores how the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Services Modernization Act (GLBA),'4 one of the most
influential banking legislative acts, affects usury laws." The Note
then explores the public policy surrounding usury laws." Finally,
this Note addresses the practical impact of strict usury laws and
whether states are well served by retaining such laws."
II. PREEMPTION OF STATE USURY LAWS:
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Beginning with the landmark case McCulloch v. Maryland"
in 1819, banking law has occupied a prominent position in the
federal preemption of state laws.' The central theme established
by the Court mandates that "States have no power... to retard,
impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations" of a
federal banking instrumentality. 0 Essentially, McCulloch declared
that federal law preempts conflicting state law under the authority
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. '
12. See infra notes 18-63 and accompanying text. The Supremacy Clause
provides that state laws interfering vith or contrary to lav.s made by Congress are
preempted and, therefore, invalid. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1. 77-78 (1824).
13. See infra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
14. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1q99, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
15. See infra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 64-95 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 96-116 and accompanying text.
18. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (setting aside a state
tax on the operations of the Bank of the United States).
19. Ld.; see John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption of State
Banking Law, 18 ANN. REnv. BANKING L. 221, 2 6 (1999).
20. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
21. Id. The Supremacy Clause provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or %;hich
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
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Since McCulloch, there has been continuous difficulty in
balancing federal and state banking authority. "A lingering
congressional, judicial and popular ambivalence toward federal
and state banking powers, and the difficulty our governmental
institutions have had in finding a golden mean, are shown by
recent Supreme Court cases sustaining federal pre-emptions of
state [usury] limits."22 In an attempt to preserve the dual federal
and state banking system, "Congress occasionally responds to
perceived tilts of the Court, regulators, or state legislators to one
side or the other with legislative initiatives .... Further indication
of the continuing strength of the conflict [between national and
state chartered banks] is the proliferation of express state law
preemption., 23
Today, through federal preemption, national banks are
lawfully permitted to charge at least the same rate of interest that
a particular state allows its state banks.24 Banks are further
permitted to charge interest at the same rate allowed by the laws
of the state where the bank is "located" rather than at the rate
mandated by the host state.25 This means that banks may charge
either the interest rate allowed by the state in which it is doing
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
22. See Duncan, supra note 19, at 221-23.
23. Id. at 222-23; see, e.g., infra notes 24-63 and accompanying text. National
banking associations are banks with a national charter and are formed as
"instrumentalities of the [f]ederal government, created for a public purpose." Davis
v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896). The Supreme Court concluded that
states may not exercise control over national banks or affect their operation except
where allowed by Congress. Id. Thus, federal law rather than state law governs the
interest rate that a national bank may charge. Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l. Bank v.
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1875). On the other hand, state banks are banks formed
under a state charter. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 4, at 212.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (originally enacted as section thirty of the National
Bank Act of 1864); Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409. 412-13 (1874). The
Court made the basic inference that Congress simply did not intend national banks to
be unfairly suppressed by state laws or to meet their demise from lack of actual
competition between national and state banks. Id. at 412-13. Prior to the National
Bank Act, a state was able to effectively dictate that a state bank could charge higher
rates than a national bank. See id.
25. 12 U.S.C. § 85; Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 411 (interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 85 as enabling
national banks to charge at least the same rate of interest as in-state banks). Prior to
this legislation national banks were limited by the cap host states placed on their state
banks. See Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 411.
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business or its home state, whichever is higher.2' Consequently,
national banks are able to import a more favorable interest rate
from their home state into a state with conservative usury laws.2
Moreover, late payment fees may be assessed according to the
usury laws where a bank is deemed located; therefore, late
payment fee rates may be imported into a state with strict usury
laws essentially in order to charge consumers higher interest
rates.28
Once again recognizing the reality of the changing banking
market, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal).", The Act
focused on geographic restrictions for banking operations allowing
"a single national bank headquartered in one state, having only
one charter, to open branches in other states, whether nearby or
26. See PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 9.04[2][b][v][B] (2d ed.
2000).
27. See Tiffany, 85 U.S. at 410. In 1978, the Supreme Court in Alarquette Nat'
Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Seri. Corp., determined that a national bank
is deemed "located" in the state specified in its organization certificate. 439 U.S. 299.
310 (1978). The Court noted that a bank "cannot be deprived of [its] location merely
because it is extending credit to residents of a foreign State." Id. The location of
credit assessments, location of payments, and location of assessments of finance
charges may also contribute to the determination of a bank's -location." Id. at 311-
12. Thus, a national bank operating branch offices or making loans in one state, but
considered to be "located" in a different state, could lawfully charge an interest rate
higher than the maximum lawful rate under state lavs. Johnson v. Bank of
Bentonvile, 122 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997 (W.D. Ark. 2U00), aqf'd, 269 F.3d 894 (8th Cir.
2001) (citing Wiseman v. State Bank & Trust, 854 S.W.2d 725 (Ark. 1993)). On the
other hand, a state bank chartered in a particular state or a national bank -located"
in that state, would be restricted by the maximum lawful interest rate specified by
that state's usury law;s. Id.
28. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 517 U.S. 735,745.47 (1996) (holding that
the term "interest," as used in 12 U.S.C. § 85, encompasses late payment fees for
national banks); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992),
cert denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993) (holding that state banks may charge interest
according to the laws of the state where the bank is located and late-payment fees are
considered interest). In Smiley, a class action suit was brought on behalf of
Californians who were holders of credit cards issued from a national bank in South
Dakota and charged late payment fees in violation of California la,. Smiky
, 
517
U.S. at 735. In Greenwood, the Court took preemption to the next level applying it
directly to state banks in addition to national banks under the broad canopy of the
Supremacy Clause. Greenwood, 971 U.S. at 831.
29. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
distant."3 Thus, a banking organization is no longer required to
operate under a bank holding company structure, which requires
maintenance of separately incorporated banks in each state of
operation." In passing Riegle-Neal, Congress acknowledged the
nationwide banking trend and succeeded in increasing competitive
equality between national and state banks in interstate
branching.32
III. GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY Acr
In response to years of continuous financial modernization
developments, Congress adopted the GLBA on November 12,
1999."3 GLBA is arguably the most comprehensive federal
banking legislation in recent history.' Section 731 of GLBA
provides:
[A]ny State that has a constitutional provision that
sets a maximum lawful annual percentage rate
[APR] of interest on any contract at not more than
5 percent above the discount rate... upon the
establishment in such State of a branch of any out-
of-State insured depository institution in such State
under this section, the maximum interest rate...
that may be charged... by any insured depository
institution whose home State is such State shall be
equal to not more than the greater of-
(A) the maximum interest rate ...that may be
charged... [in] the home State of the out-of-State
insured depository institution establishing any such
branch ... ; or
30. Rollinger, supra note 1, at 186. Prior to the enactment of Riegle-Neal, issues
of applicable state law to branches of banks were rare due to the absence of interstate
branching. Id. at 210.
31. Id., at 186.
32. See Id. 184-86. "Riegle-Neal continues to allow national banks and state
banks to export favorable interest rates out-of-state under 12 U.S.C. § 85." McCoy,
supra note 26, § 9.04[2][b][v][BJ.
33. Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 1-2 (2000).
34. Id. at 1.
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(B) the maximum rate.., that may be charged...
in a similar transaction by a State insured depository
institution chartered under the laws of such State or
a national bank or Federal savings association
whose main office is located in such State .... 3-
GLBA preempts state usury laws only where the state has a
constitutional provision that sets the "ma.ximum lawful [APR] of
interest on any contract at not more than five percent above the
discount rate. 36 The preemption clause provides that state or
nationally chartered banks may lawfully charge the same interest
rate on loans as their competitors, which includes banks chartered
in another state that have branched into the state.37 The purpose
and effect of this provision is to "provide for loan pricing
parity among interstate and local banks."'' GLBA changed
"the competitive environment for state-chartered banks
dramatically... to ensure that [they] can continue to meet all their
customers' needs in the new world of financial services and to
preserve the state bank charter as a viable platform for conducting
the modem business of banking."
Section 731 of GLBA directly targeted Arkansas, the only
remaining state with a constitutional provision that set the
maximum lawful APR of interest at not more than five percent
above the Federal Reserve discount rate (discount rate) for ninety-
day commercial paper.4 This specific provision of the Arkansas
35. 12 U.S.C. § 1S31u(f) (2000).
36. Id.
37. Id. For example, a state chartered bank or a nationally chartered bank
located in a particular state was previously restricted to that state's usury laws Vhile
an interstate bank which had branched into that same state could lawfully import a
higher interest rate. Johnson v. Bank of Bentonville, 122 F. Supp. 2d 994, 993 (\V.D.
Ark. 2000), aff'd, 269 F.3d 894 (Sth Cir. 2001).
3S. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
39. The Effect otf Usury Limits on Consmner Lenders in Texas and The Impact of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley on Consuner Credit Laws in Texas: Testimony Bcfore the
Senate Interim Economic Development ComnL Subcomm. on Consumer Credit Laws,
77th Sess. 1 (Tex. April 25, 2000) (statement of Randall S. James, Banking
Commissioner, State of Texas). available at http:Ilww, .w.finmod.state.tx.us!contentl
state/dob120000425.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 202) [hereinafter Testimoy, Before
Economic Development Commn..
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(f) (Section 731 of GLBA does not specifically mention
Arkansas, but practically this provision applies only to Arkansas since it is the only
4172002]
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Constitution had been in effect since 1981, enacted during a time
of high interest rates when the discount rate was as high as
fourteen percent.4' Recently, however, the discount rate has fallen
dramatically,42 placing Arkansas state chartered banks at a
competitive disadvantage with out-of-state banks with branches in
Arkansas, which were able to charge a higher imported interest
rate.43
The continuous preemption of state usury laws had resulted
in an uneven playing field between national and state chartered
banks within Arkansas.44 Congress noted that "if an interstate
bank can charge a particular interest rate, then a local bank in the
State into which the interstate bank has branched, may charge a
comparable rate., 45 Thus, the ability of interstate banks to charge
greater interest rates than Arkansas state chartered banks led to
Congress' enactment of section 731 of GLBA, whereby all
national and state chartered banks within Arkansas have the
opportunity to charge the same interest rate.46 As a result, banks
in Arkansas are lawfully able to charge the highest interest rate
allowed in any state from which a bank has branched into
Arkansas so long as the rate is not deemed unconscionable.47
state in the Union that meets the statutory requirements); Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d
at 997; Testimony Before Economic Development Comm., supra note 39, at 1.
41. Tim Taylor, Revision A Boon To Banks, TIMES REC. (Fort Smith, Ark.), Dec.
3, 2001, available at http://www.swtimes.com/archive/2001/December/03Ibusiness/
Revision.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
42. John M. Berry, Fed Trims Rates but Cites Gains, WASH. PosT, Dec. 12, 2001,
at Al. On December 11, 2001, the Federal Reserve lowered the discount rate to
1.25%, the lowest since August 1948. Id.
43. Taylor, supra note 41. "Divergent views [in Arkansas between economists,
politicians, bankers, and the citizens] created a perception that a remedy to the
economic harm caused by the artificial interest limitation might not be possible if a
popular vote were sought." Grooms, supra note 6.
44. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
45. Johnson v. Bank of Bentonville, 122 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (W.D. Ark. 2000),
aff'd, 269 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. 106-434 discussing §
731).
46. 8th Circuit Trumps Constitution: Interest Rates Unlocked in State of Arkansas,
BANKERS DIG., Oct. 15, 2001, available at http://www.bankersdigest.com/features-
2001_4q/101501_feature.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002) [hereinafter 8th Circuit
Trumps Constitution].
47. Id.; Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 16-20,
Johnson v. Bank of Bentonville, 122 F. Supp. 2d 994 (W.D. Ark 2000) (No. 00-3026)
[hereinafter Defendant's Briefj. In order to avoid potential litigation, many banks in
Arkansas waited until section 731 of GLBA was interpreted in court before raising
418 [Vol. 6
POWERS UNDER GLBA
Johnson v. Bank of Bentoniville illustrates the impact of
GLBA's preemption of Arkansas' usury laws4  The case
developed after Steve Johnson, a citizen and resident of Arkansas,
obtained a personal loan from the Bank of Bentonville, a bank
organized under Arkansas law with its principal place of business
in Arkansas. 49 Prior to GLBA, the Bank of Bentonville was
restricted to the interest rate established by the Arkansas
constitution while out-of-state banks with a branch in Arkansas
were lawfully permitted to charge interest according to the laws of
their home state.50 Relying on GLBA's federal preemption of
state usury laws, however, the Bank of Bentonville charged
Johnson an interest rate of 16.5%,5" rather than the maximum
legal interest rate of 10.5% allowed under the Arkansas
Constitution at the time of the loan. 2
Johnson filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Arkansas alleging that GLBA section 731
was unconstitutional and the loan therefore was usurious.53
Johnson argued that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause and that the principles of dual sovereignty were
violated when Congress preempted the Arkansas State
Constitution.'1  The bank, however, contended that GLBA
interest rates above the legal limit set in the Arkansas State Constitution. See Susan
Wesson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Arkansas Usury Law and Its Effects on
Arkansas Residents and Institutions, ACADEMIC FORUM ONLINE, HENDERsON SiATE
UNIVERsITY, No. 18 (2000-01), at http:I//l,.v.hsu.edulfaculty/afi,-)-IUU-Oliwesson.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2002).
48. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 994.
49. Id. at 995-996. "The Arkansas Bankers Association [ABA] was instrumental
in finding the plaintiff and defendant in this action. [This is not a -test"] case, but the
matter would not have proceeded as it did vithout the ABA support." Email from
Allen W. Bird U1, Attorney at Law, to Amanda Hill (Oct. 11, 2011, 02:45:22 EST) (on
file with N.C. Banking Institute)n Allen W. Bird II was counsel for the Bank of
Bentonville in Johnson. 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 994.
50. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 995-997; see McCov. supra note 26, §
9.04[2][b][v][B].
51. Defendant's Brief, supra note 47, at 1. The bank also charged loan fees that,
if counted as interest, would have made the APR 17.915%. Id.
52. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 996. All activity surrounding the loan ,as
contained within the state of Arkansas. Id. at 995-996.
53. Id. at 999; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(f) (2000).
54. Press Release, Arkansas Bankers Association (Oct. 4, 2001) at
http:/v.TT.,.arlbankers.orgIStaticContent/StaticPagesfcourtdecision.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2002). The Commerce Clause permits Congress "to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.... i.e., those activities that
4192002]
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preempted the usury provision of the Arkansas Constitution, thus
allowing the bank to apply the interest rate imported by an
interstate bank.
The district court granted a motion for summary judgment
in favor of the Bank of Bentonville and held that "Congress did
not exceed the legislative authority granted it by the Commerce
Clause when it enacted [section] 731 of the [GLBA]. 56 Therefore,
Arkansas' state usury laws were preempted, and the loan to
Johnson from the Bank of Bentonville at the imported interest
rate was not usurious. 7
Following the district court's decision, Johnson appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.58
Johnson once again claimed that "by enacting section 731,
Congress violated the principles of dual sovereignty by overriding
Arkansas' state constitution and exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." 59 On
October 4, 2001, the Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's
decision stating "[s]ection 731 preempts state law without violating
the principles of dual sovereignty.... [and] Congress did not
exceed its power under the Commerce Clause by enacting section
731. ,,60
substantially affect interstate commerce." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
609 (2000) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,568 (1995)).
Prior to the enactment of section 731, banks operating within
Arkansas were placed at a competitive disadvantage as compared
to national banks because of their inability to charge equivalent
interest rates, thereby affecting the flow of currency between
Arkansas and other states. It was within Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause to eliminate this disparity by enacting
section 731.
8th Circuit Trumps Constitution, supra note 46.
55. See Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 996. The bank imported usury law from the
state of Alabama (Alabama Code 1975 §8-8-5). Defendant's Brief, supra note 47, at
16-18.
56. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
57. Id.
58. Johnson v. Bank of Bentonville, 269 F.3d 894, 895 (8th Cir 2001).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 895-896. The plaintiffs attorney, Steve Davis, said that he did not
expect the Eighth Circuit's decision to be appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. David Smith, Demise of Usury Law Possible After Appeals Ruling, ARK.
DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Oct. 5,2001, at D1.
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Ultimately, Johnson is a significant assertion of federal
dominance over state usury laws and leaves little room to question
federal preemptive authority.6 This case clarifies the usury laws in
Arkansas, provides for equal competition among banks, and
supports the trend for federal preemption of state usury laws. 2
Critics argue, however, that GLBA section 731 imposes liberal
usury laws from other states on Arkansas.P3
IV. PUBLIC POLICY SURROUNDING USURY LAWS
As examples from Aristotle to the Bible illustrate, "usury
laws have been enacted throughout most of recorded history."'
There is conflicting rationale behind the justification and extent to
which usury laws should be implemented and whether control
should be vested at the state or federal level."5  This section
explores the public policy positions of various consumer interest
groups and the banldng industry.
The primary public policy reason supporting usury laws is
consumer protection. 6 Usury laws are enacted with the intent to
protect those individuals with poor credit who are uneducated and
financially unsophisticated.67 Usury laws are intended to assure
61. See Johnson, 269 F3d at S95-96, see also Smith, supra note 0, at D1 ("The
ruling may be the end of a decades-long battle to do away vith [Arkansas'] usury
law.").
62. See Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 997, 1001; 8th Circuit Trimps Constitution,
supra note 46; Taylor, supra note 41.
63. See, eg., Smith, supra note 60, at D1 (Arl:ansas banks "will be willing to loan
money now since they can gouge [borrowersl with higher interest rates." (quoting
Alan Hughes, president of AFL-CIO in Arkansas)).
64. BROOME & MARKHAm, supra note 4, at 351 ("'Unto a stranger thou mayest
lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury ...... (quoting
Deuteronomy 23:20)); James Doti, Commare N'Ciuzza and the Loan
Shark, LIBERTY HAVEN, at http:/v,,v.T,.libertyhaven.comfpoliticsandcurrenteventsL
constitutionscourtsandlav/commare.shtml (last visited Feb. 2S, 2002); Ann Pettifor,
The Urgent Need for Economic Transformation: Subordinating the Interests of
Finance Capital to Human Rights, JUBILEE +, at http:www,,.jubilecplus.
org/analysisarticlesleconomi_transformationAnn.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
65. CONTROLLING INTEREST, supra note S; see infra notes 66-95 and
accompanying text.
66. BROOME & LmziAM, supra note 4, at 351.
67. Id. "[Sub-prime] borrowers who are unsure about their credit history and
loan eligibility or are unaware of mortgage details" are often targets of abusive
lending practices. Home Loan Protection Act: A Model State Statute, at AARP
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that consumers borrowing from banks pay a reasonable interest
rate.68 The hope is that consumers who are not financially well
informed will not fall victim to unfair lending practices.69
Individual consumers often have difficulty understanding
interest rates and their full implications.7" Additionally, an
uneducated consumer is disadvantaged due to a bank's superior
bargaining power and resources.71 For example, in areas of non-
traditional lending such as payday lending and instant tax refunds,
consumers are not protected against high interest rates and
consequently often pay APRs that exceed 100% interest.
Consumer interest groups contend that without strict usury laws,
these customers will face lending institutions unprotected.
Consumer interest groups also contend that the poorest
segments of the population pay more when usury limits are
uncontrolled. 74  To compensate for less than desirable credit,
banks will charge those customers higher interest rates than
customers that have more resources and higher credit ratings.75
Consumer interest groups argue that the result is "intensive
consumer abuses against people least able to endure them or fight
back., 7 6 The consumer interest groups argue that the repeal of
protective state usury laws leads to interest rate gouging in favor of
big businesses.77
Research Center, at http://research.aarp.org/consume/dl7346-loanl.html (last
visited Feb. 27, 2002).
68. Wesson, supra note 47.
69. Id.
70. Scott Andrew Schaaf, Note, From Checks to Cash: The Regulation of the
Payday Lending Industry, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 339, 345-348 (2001); David Wessel,
Capital: Accounting for Those Without Banks, WALL ST. J., June 28,2001, at Al.
71. Schaaf, supra note 70, at 345-347; Wessel, supra note 70, at Al.
72. Schaaf, supra note 70, at 345-347; Wessel, supra note 70, at Al.
73. Schaaf, supra note 70, at 345-347; Wessel, supra note 70, at Al.
74. Ralph Nader, In the Public Interest: Business Crime, Fraud and Abuse Mean
the Poor Still Pay More, The Nader Page, Feb. 22, 2000, at http://www.nader.
org/interest/022200.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
75. Schaaf, supra note 70, at 345-347; Wessel, supra note 70, at Al. Banks
consider "risk return" when assessing potential customers: if banks do not receive
more profit when extending "risky" loans, then high risk customers will be unable to
obtain financing due to a higher anticipated default rate. See Sandra J. McLaughlin,
Usury Relief Is Essential for a Healthy Bank Card Industry, AM. BANKER, Sept. 21,
1981, at 10; see Taylor, supra note 41.
76. Nader, supra note 74.
77. id.
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Another concern voiced by consumer groups is that if
interest rates are unregulated, banks vill charge as much as the
market can bear, squeezing out large segments of the population:3
Such unregulated "competition leads to insufficient credit
rationing" which in turn leads to marginalization of the poor who
are unable to escape their financial situation.-'  Among other
reasons, consumer interest groups oppose the practice of charging
what the market would bear based on moral grounds." They
advocate that it is virtually impossible for the poor and financially
unsophisticated to improve their financial situations without the
ability to obtain reasonable interest rates on loans? l
The banking industry, on the other hand, presents the
alternative viewpoint of the public policy debate. First, banks
argue that consumers considered high credit risks are more likely
to have access to financing if there is increased flexibility in the
level of interest charged based on the risk of the transaction. " If
78. See NAN DAWKINS SCULLY & DAPHNE WYSHAM, SUSTAINABLE, ENERGY &
ECONOMY NETWORK, THE WORLD BANK'S CO NSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE
POOREST: OPPORTUNITY OR LIABILITY FOR THE VORLD'S POOREST WOMEN?
(executive summary) (1998), at http:llv.w-.seen.orgtpagefreportg-vapsm-chtml
(last visited Feb. 27,2002).
79. Giuseppe Coco & David de Meza, In Defense of Usur, Laws cover page(working draft) (presented at a University of Waxick Department of Economics
weekly seminar Oct. 5, 2001), at http:l wv.-.varvick.a.ukJfacsoke-conomisJ
seminarsfdemeza.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2002).
80. BROOM & XAwfHM, supra note 4, at 351.
SL See SCULLY & WYSHAM, supra note 78. For example, ,ithout the ability to
obtain a loan at a reasonable rate, many consumers are unable to purchase homes or
cars. See Nader, supra note 74. These consumers will often participate in the rent-to-
own phenomena, purchasing appliances and furniture at t'vo to three times the cash
price. Id. Furthermore, the rent-to-own industry targets "low-income consumers by
advertising in ethnic media, public transportation, and housing projects." Id.
82. Taylor, supra note 41; see Paul Beckett, Risky Business: Etploiting a
Loophole, Banks Skirt State Laws On High Interest Rates, WALL ST. J., My 25, 21001,
at Al (discussing that a high credit risk consumer was able to receive a loan vith an
annualized interest rate of 443% as a result of "banks' right to trump state usury
laws."); see also Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banhhng Agencies' Guidance on
Subprime Lending: Regulation With a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. B NKING INST. 73 (2002)
(discussing regulation of banks in the subprime market). But see Margot Saunders,
The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C.
BANUNG INST. 111, 141 (2002) ("To the industry's cry of reduced credit availability,
the [consumer] advocacy community responds: only bad credit %,ill be reduced, not
good credit.... 'A borrower does not benefit from... expanded access to credit if
the credit is offered on unfair terms or involves predatory practices.'" (internal
citations omitted)).
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rates are set artificially low, without regard to risk profiles, there
will be credit rationing. 3 This economic reality is a result of the
financial risk banks must assume when lending money to those
individuals with credit records that are poor or are simply not well
established.84 "Moreover, in times of inflation, fixed upper limits
on interest rates may make borrowed funds totally unavailable [to
the entire market] if market rates exceed the fixed interest rate
limit."85
Second, the banking industry notes that banks provide
desirable employment and capital.86  In light of federal
preemption, however, banks are choosing to locate in states with
liberal usury laws.87 These banks are then allowed to export
favorable interest rates from their home states into the legislatively
88conservative states. 8 Therefore, a state with strict usury laws risks
the loss of highly desirable banking jobs and capital as its banks
relocate their "homes" to other states.89
Furthermore, prior to the provisions of GLBA section 731,
credit markets were stagnant in areas where certain banks were
restricted to low interest rates while other banks had greater
freedom.9 As a result of these new provisions, the restricted
banks saw an increased independence and flexibility. They
established interest rates that were able to appeal to a wider range
of consumers, thereby increasing their profits."
Finally, federal preemption of state usury laws provides
banks with additional freedom when choosing where to locate and
establish their charter.9 As usury laws become increasingly
standardized, banks are more likely to look at other factors when
choosing a headquarters. 93  These factors may include other
83. Wesson, supra note 47.
84. Taylor, supra note 41.
85. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 4, at 351. Prior to the enactment of
GLBA section 731, some consumers in Arkansas were unable to obtain loans.
Taylor, supra note 41.
86. See Grooms, supra note 6; see Taylor, supra note 41; see, e.g., supra notes 8-11
and accompanying text.
87. See Testimony Before Economic Development Comm., supra note 39, at 1-2.
88. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
89. See Grooms, supra note 6.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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banking regulations in the state, the presence of other businesses,
availability of desirable consumers, and externalities such as
lifestyle and cost of living in a particular state."" Banks are
increasingly able to consider these multiple factors since federal
law allows banks to import interest rates and use the same rates
available to other banks within the state?5
V. PRACTICAL IMPACT: WHETHER STATE LEGISLATURES ARE
WELL SERVED BY RETAINING STRICT USURY LAWS
Federal preemption of state usury laws has long been a
source of disagreement and debate. -' Scholars have noted that
"[c]onflicts inhere in permitting a meaningful role to fifty state
governments despite a constitutionally mandated supremacy of
federal law." 97 Traditionally state governments have regulated
usury laws with the intent of protecting consumers from high
interest rates, but the modem trend has favored federal
preemption. " As a result of this preemption, banking rules are
becoming more standardized and there is movement towards a
uniform nationwide banking system."' Therefore, in light of the
current banking market, it may be necessary for state legislative
bodies to reexamine whether strict usury laws are actually
beneficial, burdensome, or inapplicable to their citizens."'
While many bankers and economists recognize that strict
usury laws can be harmful to state economies, citizens perceive the
state usury limitations as protective.' Often it is difficult to
educate millions of voters who are unfamiliar with banking and
business practices about the unintended consequences of
restrictive usury limits.'0 2  This public perception makes it
politically difficult for elected officials to recommend removing
94. Grooms, supra note 6.
95. Id.
96. Duncan, supra note 19, at 221.
97. Id.
98. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 318, 828 (Ist Cir. 1992).
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052 (1993); Brady & Purpura, supra note 3. at 257.
99. Brady & Purpura, supra note 3, at 263.
100. See Grooms, supra note 6.
10L Id.
102. Id.
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restrictive usury limits. °3 Additionally, depending on the climate
in a state, it can be detrimental to a political career to advocate for
less restrictive usury laws.' °4
Prior to the level of federal preemption that exists today,
national (and some state) banks were disadvantaged regarding
interstate branching and interest rates that could lawfully be
charged. °5 Disadvantaged banks were unable to compete with
their dual banking system counterparts because they were
competing against other banks that had imported more lenient
usury restrictions." Today, however, preemption has reached a
level in which the various banks operate on a more even playing
field.0 7 The question remains, however: are usury laws meeting
their purpose of consumer protection?
For example, usury laws do not apply to all financial
transactions.0 8 Payday lenders and other non-traditional lenders
circumvent usury laws and charge customers outrageous amounts
of interest by forming partnerships with banks that hold national
charters."° The loans are technically issued through the national
bank; therefore, state usury laws are largely avoided."0
Consumers with less than desirable credit and a lack of financial
knowledge are the primary customers of nontraditional banking
services; therefore, usury laws are not meeting the goals of
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See supra notes 33-63 and accompanying text.
106. 8th Circuit Trumps Constitution, supra note 46.
107. Taylor, supra note 41.
108. Paul Beckett, U.S. Tells Bank to End Support of Payday Loan, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 4, 2002, at C1 [hereinafter Beckett, U.S. Tells Bank].
109. Id. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ordered Eagle National Bank
in Pennsylvania to stop "lending its national bank charter" to one of the nation's
largest payday lenders. Id. Attorney General Roy Cooper of North Carolina filed
suit against a payday lender claiming that the lender is "renting" a national charter in
order to avoid state usury laws. Complaint for North Carolina at 1-3, North Carolina
v. Ace Cash Express, Inc. (N.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 2002), at http://www.banking.
state.nc.us/cc/nccompl.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); Press Release, North Carolina
Commissioner of Banks, North Carolina Attorney General Asks Jude to Stop Illegal
Payday Lending Scheme (Jan. 14, 2002), at http://www.jus.state.nc.us/in/press/
01142002.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002). The action requests "injunctive relief to
restrain [payday lenders] from offering, arranging and making usurious consumer
loans...." Complaint for North Carolina at 1, North Carolina v. Ace Cash Express,
Inc. (N.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 2002), at http://www.banking.state.nc.us/ccl
nccompl.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
110. Beckett, U.S. Tells Bank, supra note 108, at C1.
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protecting the disadvantaged."' Perhaps the current emphasis on
predatory lending practices and proposed legislation to regulate
sub-prime lending practices would help to protect the public;
however, this must be done in a manner that does not restrict
credit availability or unduly burden the financial community.
The usury laws, however, are not altogether inapplicable.
In-state lenders that are not banks, such as Household Finance
Corporation, are still required to follow state usury laws and are
not part of the group of banks covered under GLBA." This
means that these non-bank lenders are unable to compete on a
level playing field with traditional lenders and may be forced out
of business."' Ultimately, competition among various lenders is
suppressed and the market suffers.
Therefore, even though State legislatures have a noble goal
in protecting their citizens, strict state usury limits have not
actually achieved this intended goal. Moreover, states with strict
usury limits have seen capital and jobs leave their states."4 For
example, the North Carolina Deputy Commissioner of banks
estimated that the state has experienced a loss of several thousand
jobs over the years as state legislators refused to loosen credit card
regulations."5 In 1997 alone, Branch Banking and Trust Company
(BB&T) (a bank based in Winston-Salem) moved its credit card
business from North Carolina to Georgia, and Raleigh-based First
Citizens Bank opened their credit card operations in Virginia."'
These observations suggest that state legislatures may be
well served to reevaluate the current laws and reconsider their grip
111. See id.
112. Household Finance Corporation, at http:tiw,w.householdfinance.com (last
visited Feb. 27, 2002); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(f) (not applicable to non-bank
lenders). Note that the Household Finance Corporation is an equity lender. Robin
Paul Malloy, Lender Liability for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REx,. 53, 60 (1984).
113. See Taylor, supra note 41. Household Finance does not serve customers in
Arkansas due to the strict interest rates. Sce Frequently Asked Questions,
Household Finance Corporation, at http:llvwwwv.householdfinance.comnfn
InhfFaqs.jsp (last visited Feb. 27, 2002). In addition to Arkansas, Household
Finance does not do business in Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, North Dalota, South
Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
114. Carron, supra note 7, at 5.
115. Id. Otis Meacham was the North Carolina Deputy Commissioner of banks in
1997. Id. "North Carolina laws prohibit creditors from charging late fees and cash
advance fees, along vith the higher rates allowed in some other states." Id.
116. Id.
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on usury limits. Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to
the complex problems that have surrounded usury limits for
decades. Furthermore, the difficult challenge of reforming usury
laws would be most effective if each state participates. Ultimately,
in light of the current economy, it might be advantageous for state
legislatures to revisit usury laws in search of an ideal system that
would strike a balance between serving the public policy goal of
consumer protection and allowing businesses to make a fair profit.
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